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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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In July of 2008, Mr. John J. Young, Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, issued a memorandum titled Implementing Lifecycle Management 
Framework. The memorandum addresses the need for Performance-based Lifecycle 
Management and is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most recent effort to improve weapon 
system readiness while reducing costs and cycle-times.  
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States DoD developed and refined 
an acquisition process focused on responding to a predictable, monolithic threat. The process 
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built upon several underlying principles, including a desire for US technological superiority, a 
competitive industrial base, and a relatively long planning and requirements horizon. Over the 
course of 60 years, the DoD attempted to improve its acquisition and lifecycle process through a 
series of incremental changes to address requirements creep, cost growth, funding instability, 
and technical risk. 
Currently, the US faces significant economic and national security threats from near- 
peer competitors, rogue states, and transnational terrorist organizations. This multiplicity of 
threats requires an agile, cost-efficient process to mature and sustain military capabilities. A 
fundamental change to DoD lifecycle management is required to achieve that necessary agility. 
This paper explores fundamental changes within government and industry to evolve a 
highly agile and responsive lifecycle process. Such a process would include effects-based 
requirements to enable effective cost/performance trades, a commercially driven research and 
development model to instill technology and requirements discipline, and industry provided 
lifecycle product support based on best-in-class performance. This paper summarizes those 
changes to enable and enhanced readiness. 
“The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind  
is getting an old one out.” 
—B. H. Liddell Hart 
 
Background 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition and sustainment processes are straining 
under the demands of the Global War on Terror, an increase in Congressional oversight, and an 
emerging shortage of skilled acquisition and sustainment professionals. Significant cost and 
schedule growth, extended development cycles, schedule delays, elongated logistics response 
times, and increasing backorders are evidence of those strains. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) documented a 36% percent cost growth for major defense acquisition programs 
and characterized DoD logistics as high risk (GAO, 2008a). Additionally, the DoD continues to 
struggle to keep pace with and develop new technologies and is no longer the catalyst driving 
the development of new revolutionary technology (Hagar, 2008).  
In July 2008, the Defense Science Board (DSB) issued its report, “Creating an Effective 
National Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address the Coming 
Crisis.” The report provided several specific recommendations to enable the DoD to achieve 
lower costs, field capabilities faster, and improve logistics support. The DoD also recently issued 
revised guidance on implementing a lifecycle management framework that focuses on lifecycle 
metrics, aligning resources and readiness, and implementing performance-based lifecycle 
product support (Young, 2008). 
Our current national security posture and federal budget dictate that the DoD and 
industry continue to explore and refine new acquisition and sustainment processes to enable 
greater agility and capability at reduced costs. Capitalizing on market forces as an alternative to 
government regulations will permit the DoD to achieve the desired agility. In order to 
comprehend the challenges the DoD faces in achieving that agility, one must first review the 
path that the DoD and industry have traveled since World War II. 
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The World War II Acquisition and Logistics Environment 
The acquisition process during the Second World War focused on mass production of 
weapon and support systems, as the American economy served as the heart of the Allied war 
effort. The United States produced over 2.4 million vehicles, 88,000 tanks, and 303,000 aircraft 
during the war with the lend-lease program exporting $57.4 billion worth of equipment to its 
allies. The US industrial complex was beyond the range of enemy attack, resulting in production 
numbers that exceeded that of the Allies and the enemy combined (Dana, 1998). The ability of 
US industrial base to rapidly transition from civilian to defense production enabled the Allied 
victory in World War II (Dana, 1998). 
Acquisition and Logistics during the Cold War 
In 1945, as Americans celebrated the end of World War II, US industrial capacity 
transitioned from a wartime footing to a commercial market burgeoning with pent-up demand. 
Commonality in manufacturing processes, similarity in products, and a dramatic increase in 
demand for consumer durables made for a relatively smooth transition to a peacetime, 
consumer-driven economy.  
The subsequent emergence of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor gave birth to a 
dedicated defense industry that focused on developing and manufacturing the increasingly 
complex systems needed for deterrence (Defense Science Board, 2006). Weapons system 
acquisition during this period displayed several critical market characteristics:  
1. A monolithic threat enabled the US to concentrate on relatively stable and 
predictable requirements 
2. A national decision to capitalize on technology to seize and maintain qualitative 
superiority led the DoD and industry to concentrate on equipment performance 
3. A robust set of industrial competitors enabled the DoD to experiment, develop, 
and prototype needed technologies while capitalizing on competitive market 
forces 
4. A national decision to forward deploy forces in Europe and Korea encouraged 
large logistics footprints of supplies, personnel, and maintenance facilities to also 
be forward deployed 
5. A national will that supported DoD efforts and provided funding at approximately 
5-15% of the GDP (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2006)  
6. A supportive environment of exploratory technology that tolerated test failures 
and allowed new data findings 
The DoD and industry became increasingly governed by unique government practices—
first in engineering and manufacturing, then in finance and business, with the DoD specifications 
and standards numbering 30,000 by 1980 (Poston, 2003). These specifications and standards 
drove a wedge between defense and commercial industries and served as significant barriers 
for non-defense firms trying to enter the defense market. 
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By the early 1980s, the need to improve DoD acquisition was apparent. Numerous 
studies and academic research efforts documented DoD challenges with requirements stability, 
technical/risk management, funding stability, and schedule adherence (GAO, 1982). After nearly 
three decades of Cold War, the national will was shifting to demand more efficiency and 
accountability within defense acquisition.  
The Reagan Era 
Beginning in the early 1980s, a series of incremental policy directives attempted to 
address skyrocketing weapons costs and increasing development schedules. In April 1981, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci presented thirty-two initiatives for reducing 
weapons systems costs, shortening development time and improving weapons readiness and 
support.(Carlucci, 1981). One goal of the initiatives was to control cost growth by attempting to 
achieve realism in cost estimating.  
Secretary Carlucci introduced the concept of Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I), a 
means to deploy systems and sequentially upgrade them over time (Carlucci, 1981). This 
strategy was intended to minimize technological risk, and quicken the pace of modernization of 
the nation’s armed forces. Other recommendations included the production of weapons systems 
at more efficient rates, reduction in the number of DoD directives, more advantageous use of 
competition, and greater use of standardized subsystems and support equipment. These 
initiatives represented a comprehensive list of measures with the potential to lower costs, but 
did not address the major causes of cost growth in weapons systems such as technical risk, 
requirements creep, and cost-plus business arrangements (Foelber, 1982).  
During this period, Congress also took steps to curb the rising cost of weapons systems 
including the introduction of more rigorous DoD reporting requirements, the establishment of 
audit procedures for acquisition activities, and wider use of multi-year contracts (Lockwood, 
1983). 
The Packard Commission 
President Reagan established the Packard Commission in 1986 to reduce the 
inefficiencies in the defense procurement system, with an emphasis on the acquisition process. 
The Commission’s conclusions supported the results of numerous prior studies, reporting that 
the acquisition process suffered from schedule delays, cost overruns, and inefficient 
performance (Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). The Commission 
recommended streamlining the acquisition process, increasing the amount of tests and 
prototypes, and improving planning.  
A subsequent review of 269 completed defense contracts found that the Packard 
Commission’s recommendations were ineffective in reducing cost overruns. Despite 
implementing over two dozen initiatives, there was no considerable progress in defense 
program cost performance for over 30 years (Christensen  Searle &Vickery, 1992). The 
recommendations did little to fundamentally change the DoD reward mechanisms that favored 
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Table 1. The Effect of Packard Commission Recommendations  
on Defense Cost Performance  
(Christensen, Searle & Vickery, 1992) 
 















5.6 4.1 6.2 2.8 7.6 8.1 
Final overrun after 
implementation 
(%) 
9.5 15.3 7.2 12.7 6.1 17.0 
Difference (%) 3.9 11.2 1.0 9.9 -1.5 8.9 
Statistical 
significance (p) 
0.055 0.014 0.294 0.003 0.206 0.110 
 
The End of the Cold War 
By the end of the Cold War, an industrial structure, an acquisition process, and a 
logistics system existed that were mismatched with the priorities of the American people and the 
global environment. The DoD had honed an acquisition process that focused on providing 
technologically superior systems with industry geared up to produce those systems in large 
quantities. With the dissolution of Soviet Union, the American public shifted its priorities to 
domestic issues. Multiple administrations through the 1990s responded to this shift in focus 
through force reductions, base closures, and industrial consolidation (GlobalSecurity.org, 2003).  
Specifications and Standards Reform 
In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry issued DoD policy to increase access to 
state-of-the-art technology and adopt the same business practices as world-class commercial 
suppliers. The directive attempted to reduce the complexity and costs that the DoD incurred 
when purchasing major weapon systems and their numerous maintenance requirements.  
Secretary Perry chartered a detailed cost analysis allowing the DoD to determine the 
most important cost drivers in the quest for standards reform. The study concluded that, on 
average, the DoD paid a regulatory cost premium of approximately 18 percent. The study also 
indicated that significant cost savings were achievable through reductions in DoD regulation and 
oversight (Coopers & Lybrand/TASC Inc., 1994). Since Secretary Perry introduced his plan to 
reform the acquisition process, over 1200 commercial standards have been adopted by the 
DoD; however, the DoD has not fully capitalized on commercially available solutions  (OSD(PA), 
1994).  
The procurement accounts declined in the late1990s, with fewer new systems under 
development and existing weapons platforms aging and continuing service past their intended 
lifecycles. This extended use resulted in increasing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, 
which contributed to a lifecycle “death spiral” of further deferred modernization, as shown in 























Figure 1. The DoD “Death Spiral” 
To attack this “death spiral,” the Under Secretary launched an aggressive acquisition 
and logistics reform effort. Key initiatives included increased use of commercial items, 
evolutionary acquisition, streamlined acquisition documentation, and performance-based 
logistics. These initiatives emphasized greater civil-military integration and were directed 
towards increasing acquisition and logistics agility.  
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) is the DoD’s procedure to 
define acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs. JCIDS was 
created in 2003 to address shortfalls in the DoD requirements generation system identified by 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, including not considering new programs in the context of other 
programs, not sufficiently considering combined service requirements, not effectively prioritizing 
joint service requirements, and not accomplishing sufficient analysis.  
The JCIDS process codifies a DoD policy shift away from threat-based assessments to 
capabilities-based assessments of Warfighter needs. As a replacement for developing, 
producing and fielding systems based on perceived threats to the nation, JCIDS policy enables 
the development of capabilities based on strategic direction and priorities defined in the National 
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The Global War on Terror 
Despite the perceived “peace dividend,” the migration from a bi-polar world to a multi-
polar world proved more challenging than anticipated. The DoD continued to rely on acquisition 
processes, organizations and infrastructure largely developed in the years following World War 
II. Technical superiority had proven successful against a peer competitor; however, rapid 
advancement in commercially available computing and telecommunications gave rise to multiple 
new threats: e.g., transnational terrorism and rogue state actors. This multiplicity of threats 
demanded greater agility and innovation at the same time DoD acquisition and its associated 
industrial base were contracting. September 11, 2001, proved these threats very real, initiating 
the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
Executing the GWOT is an expensive endeavor. The total amount of GWOT funding 
provided over the past seven years is approximately $804 billion. This makes the GWOT more 
expensive than both the Korean ($460 billion) and the Vietnam ($650 billion) wars (Serafino, 
2001). (See Table 3.)  
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Table 3. Cost of Selected Wars (in billions of $2007) 
(National Priorities Project, 2007) 
 
The GWOT to date has provided the United States with lessons directly related to DoD 
acquisition and sustainment. These lessons include: 
 Our requirements process is slow to react to a rapidly adaptive adversary. 
 Our acquisition process consumes billions of dollars against threats generated at a 
fraction of that cost. 
 Our mass logistics structure is insufficient to support rapid, dispersed forces. 
In September 2008, Secretary Robert Gates spoke at the National Defense University 
and addressed these issues: 
The need for the state of the art systems—particularly longer range 
capabilities—will never go away, as we strive to offset the countermeasures 
being developed by other nations. But at a certain point, given the types of 
situations we are likely to face—and given, for example, the struggles to field 
up-armored HUMVEES, MRAPs, and ISR in Iraq—it begs the question 
whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for stability and 
counterinsurgency missions is also needed.  
Secretary Gates continued: 
And how do we institutionalize procurement of such capabilities—and the ability 
to get them fielded quickly? Why did we have to go outside the normal 
bureaucratic process to develop counter-IED technologies, to build MRAPs, 
and to quickly expand our ISR capability? In short, why did we have to 
bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the capabilities we 
need to protect our troops and pursue the wars we are in? Our 
conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution in years. 
Stability and counterinsurgency missions—the wars we are in—require 75 
percent solutions in months. The challenge is whether in our bureaucracy and 
in our minds these two different paradigms can be made to coexist. 
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Time for Change 
Since the end of World War II, the United States DoD developed and refined an 
acquisition process focused on responding to a predictable, monolithic threat. This process built 
upon several underlying principals including a desire for US technological superiority, a 
competitive industrial base, and a relatively long planning and requirements horizon. Over the 
course of 60 years, the DoD attempted to improve its acquisition and lifecycle process through a 
series of incremental changes to address requirements creep, cost growth, funding instability, 
and technical risk.  
Currently, major weapon system programs within the DoD are taking longer to complete, 
costing more, and delivering quantities far lower than originally intended. The total acquisition 
cost of the DoD's 2007 major programs has increased by almost $300 billion over preliminary 
estimates (GAO, 2008a). Weapon system programs often begin without adequate information 
pertaining to requirements, technology, and design maturity. Lacking such knowledge, program 
managers often rely on unrealistic assumptions that increase program risk, cost growth and 
schedule delays (GAO, 2008a). Finally, the geopolitical environment has changed dramatically 
over the past 60 years, as summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Geopolitical Differences 


































National Will: National  will skeptical  and increasingly 
unwilling to accept  continued  rampant defense spending
 
The United States DoD can no longer afford to follow the path of incremental change to 
its acquisition and logistics process and must fundamentally transform its current acquisition 
practice. The acquisition and logistics environment of the 21st century needs a course of action 
that will decisively enable greater agility and efficiency through effects-based requirements; 
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Becoming Highly Agile and Responsive 
Effects-based Requirements  
“Requirements creep” has been a persistent problem within defense acquisition since 
World War II. This “creep” is driven by the DoD focus on technological superiority and the 
military services historic bias towards unique requirements. The JCIDS process (and 
subsequent portfolio management) was intended to correct these problems; however, the Joint 
Staff was never fully resourced to develop capstone and integrating concepts. As a result, the 
JCIDS process continues to be dominated by Service-driven requirements.  
To compensate, DoD is implementing an increasing number of common critical 
performance parameters to enhance system inter-operability and “jointness.” These 
requirements tend to be overlaid on top of Service-driven performance requirements. 
Requirements packages for major systems continue to be large, complex, and, in many cases, 
contradictory. 
In order for the DoD to enhance agility, it must begin with a requirements process that is 
appropriately focused on the military effort that is required. Requirements would be 
characterized based upon desired effect or outcome, rather than as a specific system. Such an 
approach would make maximum use of Joint Staff resources for integrated “Concepts of 
Operation,” while fostering innovation within the Services and industry to develop competing 
solutions. Industry would be empowered to provide a specific capability rapidly, within the 
constraints of the “Concept of Operations.” 
The Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program (JMVP) currently 
offers a good example of what an innovative and agile DoD acquisition process could look like. 
The MRAP program is the largest and fastest military acquisition buildup since World 
War II, with the DOD utilizing an acquisition strategy to rapidly acquire and field MRAP 
vehicles. The MRAP acquisition program established minimal operational requirements and 
relied heavily on commercially available products (GAO, 2008b). 
The DoD designated the MRAP program as DoD’s highest priority acquisition, which 
helped contractors and other industry partners to rapidly respond to the urgent need and meet 
production requirements with industry partners. This facilitated rapid fielding by generally 
meeting or exceeding planned production rates. This agile and responsive acquisition process 
saved lives and made an exponential contribution to warfighter readiness (GAO, 2008b). 
Industry-driven Research and Development  
The DoD acquisition process reinforces unique solutions via built in bias for large, long 
cost-plus development programs. These programs inherently embody incentives for cost and 
schedule growth and limited incentives for efficiency. The DoD and the Congress have 
attempted to regulate efficiency for 20 years via increased oversight and reporting, but the 
overall process seems impervious to incremental change. 
Advances in technology research and development (R&D) are currently led by the 
commercial world, where R&D has increased steadily at a rate of about 5% per year for more 
than 20 years. During this same 20-year period, DoD and government R&D spending dropped 
2.5% per year (Gansler, 2000). In order for the DoD to capitalize on commercial investment, it 
must actively engage the commercial market.  
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The “new normal” of persistent conflict and stabilization engagement demands a “new 
normal” research and development business model. Such a model would be more akin to the 
commercial development process, where industry manages product R&D (and is fully 
responsible for technology maturation of that product). The DoD would continue to invest in 
basic research within the 6.1 and 6.2 accounts and in test and evaluation of competing 
prototypes.  
This approach would incentivize industry to control requirements creep, select mature 
technologies for product integration, and develop solutions in an incremental, timely fashion. 
Such a system would inherently incentivize industry, since industry would be funding the 
development (versus the cost-plus development of today) and provide a meaningful business 
driven mechanism to moderate technical risk and ensure technical maturity (versus the 
technology readiness levels used today). 
Such on approach may not be applicable for complex, high-risk defense items (aircraft 
carriers, as an example); however, it should be appropriate for a growing number of items 
required for “persistent presence.”  In addition, this approach will require fundamental change 
within the DoD to accept industry-natured technologies and equipment built to commercial 
standards. 
Industry Provided Lifecycle Product Support  
The DoD has recently embraced an innovative approach for procuring logistics support 
for its weapons systems. In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the DoD mandated the 
implementation of Performance-based Logistics with the goal to gain the most efficient and 
effective performance of weapons systems  throughout their lifecycles, and to build successful 
business partnerships that align with the goals of all involved parties for the duration of these 
programs (Berkowitz, 2005). PBL is a business partnership model designed to align the 
interests of both the DoD and the logistics service provider: creating value and the desired 
outcomes of both partners. This yields a more cooperative venture than merely achieving 
service level agreements or getting the lowest price from the provider.   
PBLs have demonstrated success by providing superior logistics support for simple parts 
such as aviation tires, subsystems such as engines, and complete weapon systems (e.g., F-22). 
PBLs have demonstrated improved weapons systems readiness and equipment availability 
through the development of incentives for industry investment and partnerships. There are more 
than 200 PBL efforts DoD-wide that have demonstrated material availability above 95 percent 
and commercial response times of 2-4 days (versus DoD average of 16 days) (Estevez, 2005). 
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BENEFITS  PROGRAM 
AVAILABILITY 




+ 23%; 98% 
RFT  B-2 
47.2% MC (Record 
Level)  F/A-18 
-74% LRT; -33% 
RTAT 
F/A-18 SMS 32%  E-8 
99.5% Lch Rt; 97.6% 
ME  F/A-18 SMS - 84% LRT 
H-60 Avionics 14%  ALR-67(v)3 97% Avail  H-60 Avionics - 85% LRT 
Tires 17%  Sentinel 95% Avail  Tires 
-92% LRT; -100% 
B/O’s 
AEGIS 30%  Shadow 96%+ OR  APUs - 82%LRT 
F-404 Engine 46%  TAIS 98%+ Avail  LANTRIN - 90% LRT 
T-700 35%  Javelin 99%+ OR  F-404 Engine - 25% RTAT 
CIWS 9%  ITAS 99% Avail  T-700 
-74% RTAT; -100% 
B/O’s 
Mk41 VLS 8%  CGS 99% Avail  AH-64 Apache - 35% RTAT 
Sea Sparrow 14%  HIMARS 98.7% Avail  
Pegasus 
Engine - 59% RTAT 
Navy Spt 
Equip 32%  C-17 
93.5% Dpt Rel ; 
85.4%MC  CH-47 (UK) - 44% RTAT 
Nimrod (UK) 40%  C-17 Engines 70% TOW incr  F-22 - 20% RTAT 
AN/ALQ-126B 50%  T56-15 Engines + 35% TOW  B-2 - 20% RTAT (Depot) 
AN/USM-638 40%  APS-137 + 40% TOW  CIWS - 99% B/O’s 
LANTRIN 17%  AN/PSS-14 95% Eff Rate  Sea Sparrow - 90% B/O’s 
EA-6B Flt 
Cont 47%  F414 Engine 97% Avail  F-404 - 66%B/O’s 
F-22 + 15% MC  Patriot - 99% B/O’s  RFTLTS - 96% LRT 
        
RFT - Ready for Tasking TOW - Time-on-Wing    
MC - Mission Capable B/O’s - Backorders    
OR - Operational Readiness LRT - Logistics Response Time    
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Benefit ($M)  PROGRAM 
Total Cost 
Benefit ($M)  PROGRAM 
Annual Cost 
Benefit ($M) 
F-22 $14,000  ARC-210 $5.4 (8.6%)  F-22 $500 (39%) 
ALR-67(v)3 $62.7 (40%)  TH-57 $15.3 (7.9%)  CASS CSP $30 (54%) 
TOW-ITAS $350  H-60 $41 (6.5%)  TOW-ITAS $6.3 (34.5%) 
F/A-18 $688  Sea Sparrow $2.2 (6.3%)  ARCI $4 (24.7%) 
CGS $10.3 (65%)  AN/WSN-7 $0.88 (1.3%)  MK 41 VLS $1.1 (16.4%) 
MIDs-LVT $62 (54%)  AN-PSS14 $17  F-117 $124 (14.5%) 
AN/AAS-44 $31 (25.2%)  Sentinel $301.70  Navy Tires $46 (15%) 
APUs $4 (20.9%)  T-45 $85  GBMD $1.60 
AEGIS FCS $8 (19.3%)  C-17 $477  TAIS $0.01 
F405 Engine $61 (17.2%)  Navy Spt Equip $1  H-46 $0.35 
Cockpit Disp $71 (16.5%)  AN/ALQ-126B $2.10  Program 
Flying Hour Cost 
Reduction 
F100 $2 (16.3%)  AN/USM-638 $0.50  LANTIRN $9.6 (14.6%) 
AH-64 & CCAD $100  C-17 59%  F-404 Engine $79 (13.4%) 
CH-47(UK) $250  Tornado (UK) 51%  F-414 Engine $6.40 
Javelin 10%  Harrier (UK) 44%  Patriot $1 (13.1%) 
RFTLTS $0.50  Nimrod (UK) 8%    
 
The wide use of performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts ultimately puts the focus 
on readiness and rapid, agile support. PBL enables the DoD to select providers based on 
competitive value, producing partnerships with preferred providers that overtime will improve the 
DoD’s overall support capabilities (Estevez, 2005). 
Conclusion 
Despite fond memories of past glories, cost and schedule control have been persistent 
problems within defense acquisition since World War II. The DoD acquisition and lifecycle 
processes have proven to be impervious to incremental improvements, despite decades of 
study and recommendations. It is certain that for the foreseeable future we as a Nation will face 
a severely constrained fiscal environment that will put added downward pressure on defense 
and other discretionary budget elements. This situation necessitates an enterprise-wide 
Defense Department application of the proven lifecycle management practices that will ensure 
greater performance improvements and simultaneous cost savings. These significant savings 
opportunities in turn can be deployed to address the significant force modernization and 
recapitalization requirements that we face today and in the future.  
The United States cannot be certain of the international security situations it will confront 
in the next two decades. The world security environment is likely to be dramatically different and 
more active than the Cold War years, the years following, and the current GWOT. This 
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uncertainty requires an acquisition process that is agile and efficient, enabling the DoD to 
rapidly field and sustain capabilities. Such a process would include: 
• Effects-based requirements 
• Commercially driven product development 
• Industry-provided product support 
These elements present fundamental change to DoD’s lifecycle processes to meet the 
needs of the 21st century. 
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